“A Psychology which accords so extensive and so handsome a place to sensibility” (3) : a study of the Bergsonian notion of <sensibility> in his later years

In another paper I pointed out that Henri Bergson (1859-1941), a French philosopher, in his early years argues on <sensibility> from a similar viewpoint to his contemporaries’. In this paper I aim to examine his notion of <sensibility> in his later years, focusing on The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932). Although rarely pointed out, in Two Sources Bergson argues on <sensibility> from his particular point of view. He proposes “a psychology which accords so extensive and so handsome a place to sensibility,” where emotion gains an advantage over intellect and volition. When we compare The Two Sources with Technical and Critical Vocabulary of the Philosophy, a French encyclopedia published in 1926, we see that Bergson has his conception in common with his contemporaries to some extent, but that on the other hand he is outstanding among his contemporaries especially for his paying attention to the <superior component> of <sensibility>, which is characterized by activity and unity, in contrast to the <inferior component>, which is characterized by passivity and multiplicity.