The philosophical studies of Yamaguchi University


PISSN : 0919-357X

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Thomas Aquinas uses the term “mode” (modus) in various contexts, and some remarkable usages are found in his discussions on virtues. Aquinas places virtues other than the four cardinal virtues in the “potential parts” of the cardinal virtues, for instance, placing generosity (liberalitas) as a potential part of justice. Although the potential parts of a cardinal virtue are not species of the cardinal virtue, they have close connections with it. In order to explain these connections, Aquinas says that the potential parts of a cardinal virtue agree with the cardinal virtue in mode. He also claims that the mode of a virtue is, as it were, a sort of a form of the virtue, whence the virtue derives its praise and its name (ST II-II, q. 157, a. 3). In this claim, we find metaphysical, ethical, and semantic aspects of modes.
In this article, we first examine Aquinas’s usages of “modes of virtues” in order to see these aspects of modes. We conclude that “mode” means “a limit which is not to be exceeded” and “a way.”
Next, we move on to the metaphysical aspect. Aquinas has elaborate discussions on “modes,” interpreting Augustine’s triad of “mode-species-order,” the three elements which Augustine claims to be in every good created being. We will analyse three major texts in which Aquinas treats the triad as three essential components of every good creature: ST I, q. 5, a. 5, De veritate, q. 21, a. 6, and ST II-I, q. 85, a. 4. By analyzing and connecting Aquinas’s different statements about modes, we clarify what modes are and how they are related to being (esse) and forms in Aquinas’s metaphysical system.
Finally, we consider the semantic aspect, building on the preceding analyses. Since “mode” is a word that can connote perfection as well as limitation, it is possible to state that God is a mode. Since the mode is a higher principle than the form, which determines the genus and species, the mode can be a foundation of analogical predication,
in which the same word is applied to things of different genera and beyond (i.e., God).
PP. 1 - 15
PP. 17 - 46
Noe-Meinongian theories admit nonexistent objects and are generally friendly to abstract objetcts like Plato's Forms. There are several different neo-Meinongian theories, and one of them is the semantic theory of G. Priest, known as “noneism”. Is it possible to interprete Plato's theory of Forms on noneism?
Forms are supposed to have three characteristics about predication: predicatecorrespondence, self-predication and predicate-purity. In noneism, worlds are divided into possible, impossible, and open worlds, the first two being closed worlds and the actual world a possible world. In closed worlds, predication is incompatible with predicate-purity. For example, if something is F, it must also be F or G, so more than one predicates must apply to it. Further, predicate-purity fails in any possible world: more than one predicates apply to anything whatsoever. Moreover, in possible worlds, if Forms have predicate-correspondence, self-predication is unavoidable for some of them.
Things are quite different in an open world. Since open worlds are not closed under entailment, we can hold that e.g., the Form of whiteness is white and is nothing else there: it is not true that it is colored or even that it exists; the only thing that exists in an open world is the Form of existence. We also seem to be albe to admit the Forms of a golden mountain, an exisising golden mountain, something both white and not white, etc., each Form safely having the three characteristics.
This is, however, an illusion. When a matrix contains more than one free variables, infinitely many one-place predicates can be obtained from it by substitution. If they all correspond to a unique Form, it can be shown that even in an open world infinitely many predicates must apply to the same Form. Thus the predicate-purity fails. One
possible responce is to modify the denotation function so that it allocates extensions not to matrices but directly to predicates, but it comes at a cost.
PP. 47 - 63
In this paper I will consider <rétrospectivité> as a positive element of the Bergsonian notion of <durée>.
Around 1930 Henri Bergson borrows from Vladimir Jankélévitch a concept of <illusion de rétrospectivité>, which means a lack of understanding about <durée>. However, his usage of the concept seems not to be true to Jankélévitch’s, in that he regards <rétrospectivité> as a positive element of <durée>.
In my opinion, Bergson’s infidelity to Jankélévitch, so to speak, is based on his interest in <histoire>, as far as the mysticism is concerned, which bears fruit in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932). As regards this, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who criticizes Bergson for his misunderstanding <histoire>, provides an important clue.
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