Thomas Aquinas uses the term “mode” (modus) in various contexts, and some remarkable usages are found in his discussions on virtues. Aquinas places virtues other than the four cardinal virtues in the “potential parts” of the cardinal virtues, for instance, placing generosity (liberalitas) as a potential part of justice. Although the potential parts of a cardinal virtue are not species of the cardinal virtue, they have close connections with it. In order to explain these connections, Aquinas says that the potential parts of a cardinal virtue agree with the cardinal virtue in mode. He also claims that the mode of a virtue is, as it were, a sort of a form of the virtue, whence the virtue derives its praise and its name (ST II-II, q. 157, a. 3). In this claim, we find metaphysical, ethical, and semantic aspects of modes.
In this article, we first examine Aquinas’s usages of “modes of virtues” in order to see these aspects of modes. We conclude that “mode” means “a limit which is not to be exceeded” and “a way.”
Next, we move on to the metaphysical aspect. Aquinas has elaborate discussions on “modes,” interpreting Augustine’s triad of “mode-species-order,” the three elements which Augustine claims to be in every good created being. We will analyse three major texts in which Aquinas treats the triad as three essential components of every good creature: ST I, q. 5, a. 5, De veritate, q. 21, a. 6, and ST II-I, q. 85, a. 4. By analyzing and connecting Aquinas’s different statements about modes, we clarify what modes are and how they are related to being (esse) and forms in Aquinas’s metaphysical system.
Finally, we consider the semantic aspect, building on the preceding analyses. Since “mode” is a word that can connote perfection as well as limitation, it is possible to state that God is a mode. Since the mode is a higher principle than the form, which determines the genus and species, the mode can be a foundation of analogical predication,
in which the same word is applied to things of different genera and beyond (i.e., God).

本稿の目的は『今昔物語集』天竺部における釈迦仏入滅の理解を解明することにある。はじめに巻第三第二十八話～第三十五話の入滅関連諸説話、および巻第四「仏後」巻の諸説話の内容を概観する（第一節）。そのうえで、二つの観点から入滅の理解を検討する。第一の観点は、釈迦仏の最後の言葉である（第二節）。『今昔物語集』天竺部仏伝はいわゆる「釈迦八相」を踏まえて構成され、とりわけ話数の多い第七「転法輪相」以外は、『過去現在因果経』をはじめとする『釈迦譜』所引の諸経典に依拠することが確かめられている。巻第三入滅関連説話も基本的に『釈迦譜』所引『大般涅槃経』等に拠るが、入滅の瞬間を語る一話は『大悲経』を原拠とする何らかの国書に拠ると推定される。弟子一同に「不放逸」の教えを説く釈迦仏ではなく、一子羅睺羅への哀愍を諸仏に祈る釈迦仏を語ることにより、『今昔物語集』は、釈迦仏一代の教化活動を貫く慈悲の本質、すなわち、しばしば「一子の悲」という語句で表現されるところの慈悲と恩愛との一体性を示したといえる。第二の観点は、入滅後の釈迦仏の身体・力能である（第三節）。現生を生きる一人のひとであった釈迦仏の“生身”が滅び去り、とくに実母など、多生にわたり仏と親密な交わりを結んだ仏の親族において、釈迦仏の存在の一回性、代替不能性が痛切に意識された。他方、滅後も仏の慈悲に与ることを切望する人々は、釈迦仏の霊魂の不滅を信じ、その依り代となりうるもの、あるいは“生身”を超えて存続する新たな身体を想定した。仏舎利や影像がその新たな身体、不滅の霊魂の依り代であり、"生身"の有した"個"としての具体性を弱める反面、時空による制約から解放され、遠隔の地にも拡散・伝播し、未来仏出世の時まで力能を顕現し続けると期待された。何らかの方途を通じて釈迦仏を供養し、一つのささやかな善をなした衆生は、無数の後生の間、絶えず釈迦仏の加護を受け続け、ついに究極的安楽に到達しうる。この世界内の衆生には釈迦仏滅後もその慈悲が及び続けているのであり、末法の世、本朝に生まれた人々も例外でないことを『今昔物語集』天竺部は示唆していると考えられる。

Noe-Meinongian theories admit nonexistent objects and are generally friendly to abstract objetcts like Plato's Forms. There are several different neo-Meinongian theories, and one of them is the semantic theory of G. Priest, known as “noneism”. Is it possible to interprete Plato's theory of Forms on noneism?
Forms are supposed to have three characteristics about predication: predicatecorrespondence, self-predication and predicate-purity. In noneism, worlds are divided into possible, impossible, and open worlds, the first two being closed worlds and the actual world a possible world. In closed worlds, predication is incompatible with predicate-purity. For example, if something is F, it must also be F or G, so more than one predicates must apply to it. Further, predicate-purity fails in any possible world: more than one predicates apply to anything whatsoever. Moreover, in possible worlds, if Forms have predicate-correspondence, self-predication is unavoidable for some of them.
Things are quite different in an open world. Since open worlds are not closed under entailment, we can hold that e.g., the Form of whiteness is white and is nothing else there: it is not true that it is colored or even that it exists; the only thing that exists in an open world is the Form of existence. We also seem to be albe to admit the Forms of a golden mountain, an exisising golden mountain, something both white and not white, etc., each Form safely having the three characteristics.
This is, however, an illusion. When a matrix contains more than one free variables, infinitely many one-place predicates can be obtained from it by substitution. If they all correspond to a unique Form, it can be shown that even in an open world infinitely many predicates must apply to the same Form. Thus the predicate-purity fails. One
possible responce is to modify the denotation function so that it allocates extensions not to matrices but directly to predicates, but it comes at a cost.

In this paper I will consider <rétrospectivité> as a positive element of the Bergsonian notion of <durée>.
Around 1930 Henri Bergson borrows from Vladimir Jankélévitch a concept of <illusion de rétrospectivité>, which means a lack of understanding about <durée>. However, his usage of the concept seems not to be true to Jankélévitch’s, in that he regards <rétrospectivité> as a positive element of <durée>.
In my opinion, Bergson’s infidelity to Jankélévitch, so to speak, is based on his interest in <histoire>, as far as the mysticism is concerned, which bears fruit in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion (1932). As regards this, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, who criticizes Bergson for his misunderstanding <histoire>, provides an important clue.