Memory-two strategies forming symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibrium in repeated prisoners' dilemma game

We investigate symmetric equilibria of mutual reinforcement learning when both players alternately learn the optimal memory-two strategies against the oppo-nent in the repeated prisoners' dilemma game. We provide a necessary condi-tion for memory-two deterministic strategies to form symmetric equilibria. We then provide three examples of memory-two deterministic strategies which form symmetric mutual reinforcement learning equilibria. We also prove that mu-tual reinforcement learning equilibria formed by memory-two strategies are also mutual reinforcement learning equilibria when both players use reinforcement learning of memory-n strategies with n > 2.

Creators Ueda Masahiko

Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International(https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/)

[isVersionOf] 10.1016/j.amc.2022.127819

Award Economic theory of information markets based on information science 20K19884

Award Research topics Mathematical structure of payoff control in repeated games