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Necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Zero-Determinant strategies in repeated games

Journal of the Physical Society of Japan Volume 91 Issue 8 Page 084801-
published_at 2022-07-11
2022-7-11-11-5conditionZDS_220704.pdf
[fulltext] 97.9 KB
Title
Necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Zero-Determinant strategies in repeated games
Abstract
Zero-determinant strategies are a class of memory-one strategies in repeated games which unilaterally enforce linear relationships between payoffs. It has long been unclear for what stage games zero-determinant strategies exist. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of zero-determinant strategies. This condition can be interpreted as the existence of two different actions which unilaterally adjust the total value of a linear combination of payoffs. A relation between the class of stage games where zero-determinant strategies exist and other class of stage games is also provided.
Creators Ueda Masahiko
[e_rad]00826571
Affiliate Master Yamaguchi University
[kakenhi]15501 grid.268397.1
Source Identifiers [EISSN] 1347-4073
Languages eng
Resource Type journal article
Publishers Physical Society of Japan
Date Issued 2022-07-11
Rights
©2022 The Physical Society of Japan()
File Version Accepted Manuscript
Access Rights open access
Relations
[isVersionOf] https://doi.org/10.7566/JPSJ.91.084801
Funding Refs
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science [crossref_funder]https://doi.org/10.13039/501100001691
Award Economic theory of information markets based on information science 20K19884
Funding Refs
Inamori Foundation
Award Mathematical structure of payoff control in repeated games