Optimal incentive contracts under incomplete information about Effort-Outcome relationship
Yamaguchi journal of economics, business administrations & laws Volume 69 Issue 6
Page 83-90
published_at 2021-03-31
Title
行動と成果の間の確率的関係に不確実性がある場合の最適契約
Optimal incentive contracts under incomplete information about Effort-Outcome relationship
Abstract
本稿では, 行動と成果の確率的関係について不確実性があるプリンシパルーエージェント関係を考え, 最適契約を特徴付ける.
Source Identifiers
[PISSN] 0513-1758
[NCID] AN00243258
Languages
jpn
Resource Type
departmental bulletin paper
Publishers
The economic society of Yamaguchi University
Date Issued
2021-03-31
File Version
Version of Record
Access Rights
embargoed access
Schools
経済学部