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<Discontinuité> in the Bergsonian notion of <durée> : Paradoxically after bachelard

The philosophical studies of Yamaguchi University Volume 31 Page 27-36
published_at 2024-03-23
哲学研究-第31巻-004.pdf
[fulltext] 1.48 MB
Title
ベルクソン的「持続」における「不連続性」の契機 : バシュラールによる批判を逆説的な導きとして
<Discontinuité> in the Bergsonian notion of <durée> : Paradoxically after bachelard
Abstract
In this paper I will consider <discontinuité> as a positive element of the Bergsonian notion of <durée>.
Since his maiden book, Time and Free Will (1889), Henri Bergson (1859-1941) defines time as <durée>, which means uninterrupted continuity of the past, the present and the future. In opposition to Bergson, Gaston Bachelard (1884-1962), who begins to speculate on time in the 1930s, takes time to be essentially discontinuous.
According to Bachelard, it is not continuous <durée> but discontinuous <instant> that does give birth to something new, and this is why he criticizes Bergson. In my opinion, however, at least in the 1930s, Bergson himself tries to reconsider <durée> not only to be continuous but also to be discontinuous.
Creators Murakami Ryu
Affiliate Master Yamaguchi University
[kakenhi]15501 grid.268397.1
Source Identifiers [PISSN] 0919-357X
Languages jpn
Resource Type departmental bulletin paper
Publishers 山口大学哲学研究会
Date Issued 2024-03-23
File Version Version of Record
Access Rights open access