Necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Zero-Determinant strategies in repeated games
Journal of the Physical Society of Japan Volume 91 Issue 8
Page 084801-
published_at 2022-07-11
Title
Necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Zero-Determinant strategies in repeated games
Abstract
Zero-determinant strategies are a class of memory-one strategies in repeated games which unilaterally enforce linear relationships between payoffs. It has long been unclear for what stage games zero-determinant strategies exist. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of zero-determinant strategies. This condition can be interpreted as the existence of two different actions which unilaterally adjust the total value of a linear combination of payoffs. A relation between the class of stage games where zero-determinant strategies exist and other class of stage games is also provided.
Creators
Ueda Masahiko
[e_rad]00826571
Affiliate Master
Yamaguchi University
[kakenhi]15501
grid.268397.1
Source Identifiers
[EISSN] 1347-4073
Languages
eng
Resource Type
journal article
Publishers
Physical Society of Japan
Date Issued
2022-07-11
Rights
©2022 The Physical Society of Japan()
File Version
Accepted Manuscript
Access Rights
open access
Relations
[isVersionOf]
https://doi.org/10.7566/JPSJ.91.084801
Funding Refs
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
[crossref_funder]https://doi.org/10.13039/501100001691
Award
Economic theory of information markets based on information science
20K19884
Funding Refs
Inamori Foundation
Award
Mathematical structure of payoff control in repeated games