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- Ueda Masahiko

# Ueda Masahiko

Affiliate Master
Yamaguchi University

Update Date (<span class="translation_missing" title="translation missing: en.view.asc">Asc</span>)

Royal Society open science Volume 8 Issue 5
pp. 202186 -

published_at 2021-05-26

Journal of the Physical Society of Japan Volume 90 Issue 2
pp. 025002 -

published_at 2021-01-27

Applied mathematics and computation Volume 409
pp. 126370 -

published_at 2021-11-15

Journal of the physical society of Japan Volume 91
pp. 054804 -

published_at 2022-04-21

Journal of the Physical Society of Japan Volume 91 Issue 8
pp. 084801 -

published_at 2022-07-11

Zero-determinant strategies are a class of memory-one strategies in repeated games which unilaterally enforce linear relationships between payoffs. It has long been unclear for what stage games zero-determinant strategies exist. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of zero-determinant strategies. This condition can be interpreted as the existence of two different actions which unilaterally adjust the total value of a linear combination of payoffs. A relation between the class of stage games where zero-determinant strategies exist and other class of stage games is also provided.

Journal of Statistical Mechanics: Theory and Experiment Volume 2016
pp. 023206 -

published_at 2016-02-25

We study the diffusion of Brownian particles in a Gaussian random velocity field with short memory. By extending the derivation of an effective Fokker–Planck equation for the Lanvegin equation with weakly colored noise to a random velocity-field problem, we find that the effect of thermal noise on particles is suppressed by the existence of memory. We also find that the renormalization effect for the relative diffusion of two particles is stronger than that for single-particle diffusion. The results are compared with those of molecular dynamics simulations.

Operations Research Forum Volume 3
pp. 48 -

published_at 2022-09-05

Zero-determinant strategies are memory-one strategies in repeated games which unilaterally enforce linear relations between expected payoffs of players. Recently, the concept of zero-determinant strategies was extended to the class of memory-n strategies with n _ 1, which enables more compli-cated control of payoffs by one player. However, what we can do by memory-n zero-determinant strategies is still not clear. Here, we show that memory-n zero-determinant strategies in repeated games can be used to control condi-tional expectations of payoffs. Equivalently, they can be used to control ex-pected payoffs in biased ensembles, where a history of action pro_les with large value of bias function is more weighted. Controlling conditional expectations of payoffs is useful for strengthening zero-determinant strategies, because play-ers can choose conditions in such a way that only unfavorable action pro_les to one player are contained in the conditions. We provide several examples of memory-n zero-determinant strategies in the repeated prisoner's dilemma game. We also explain that a deformed version of zero-determinant strategies is easily extended to the memory-n case.