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Ueda Masahiko

Affiliate Master Yamaguchi University

Necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Zero-Determinant strategies in repeated games

Journal of the Physical Society of Japan Volume 91 Issue 8 Page 084801-
published_at 2022-07-11
Available 2023-07-11
[fulltext] 97.9 KB
Title
Necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Zero-Determinant strategies in repeated games
Abstract
Zero-determinant strategies are a class of memory-one strategies in repeated games which unilaterally enforce linear relationships between payoffs. It has long been unclear for what stage games zero-determinant strategies exist. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of zero-determinant strategies. This condition can be interpreted as the existence of two different actions which unilaterally adjust the total value of a linear combination of payoffs. A relation between the class of stage games where zero-determinant strategies exist and other class of stage games is also provided.
Creators Ueda Masahiko
Affiliate Master Yamaguchi University
[kakenhi]15501 grid.268397.1
Source Identifiers [EISSN] 1347-4073
Languages eng
Resource Type journal article
Publishers Physical Society of Japan
Date Issued 2022-07-11
Rights
©2022 The Physical Society of Japan()
File Version Accepted Manuscript
Access Rights embargoed access
Relations
[isVersionOf] https://doi.org/10.7566/JPSJ.91.084801
Funding Refs
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
Award Economic theory of information markets based on information science 20K19884
Funding Refs
Inamori Foundation
Award Mathematical structure of payoff control in repeated games