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Thomas Aquinas uses the term “mode” (modus) in various contexts, and some remarkable usages are found in his discussions on virtues. Aquinas places virtues other than the four cardinal virtues in the “potential parts” of the cardinal virtues, for instance, placing generosity (liberalitas) as a potential part of justice. Although the potential parts of a cardinal virtue are not species of the cardinal virtue, they have close connections with it. In order to explain these connections, Aquinas says that the potential parts of a cardinal virtue agree with the cardinal virtue in mode. He also claims that the mode of a virtue is, as it were, a sort of a form of the virtue, whence the virtue derives its praise and its name (ST II-II, q. 157, a. 3). In this claim, we find metaphysical, ethical, and semantic aspects of modes. In this article, we first examine Aquinas’s usages of “modes of virtues” in order to see these aspects of modes. We conclude that “mode” means “a limit which is not to be exceeded” and “a way.” Next, we move on to the metaphysical aspect. Aquinas has elaborate discussions on “modes,” interpreting Augustine’s triad of “mode-species-order,” the three elements which Augustine claims to be in every good created being. We will analyse three major texts in which Aquinas treats the triad as three essential components of every good creature: ST I, q. 5, a. 5, De veritate, q. 21, a. 6, and ST II-I, q. 85, a. 4. By analyzing and connecting Aquinas’s different statements about modes, we clarify what modes are and how they are related to being (esse) and forms in Aquinas’s metaphysical system. Finally, we consider the semantic aspect, building on the preceding analyses. Since “mode” is a word that can connote perfection as well as limitation, it is possible to state that God is a mode. Since the mode is a higher principle than the form, which determines the genus and species, the mode can be a foundation of analogical predication, in which the same word is applied to things of different genera and beyond (i.e., God).

McTaggart’s paradox and his A-theory and B-theory are basic notions in the contemporary philosophy of time. It is well known that the paradox was introduced by McTaggart’s paper called “The Unreality of Time” published in 1908, so that it has a one-hundred-year history. As for A-theory and B-theory, in contrast, McTaggart himself didn’t consider both of them at all. The notions of A-theory and B-theory came much later, 60 years after the paradox. Moreover, they had not been as popularized as they are today until quite recently, at least after the 1990s. This paper aims to trace the origin of the notions of A-theory and B-theory and show how the debates behind them, especially objections to “spatialising time,” form the notions.

Since its inception, analytic philosophy has failed to attain dominance in Japan. However, the 21st century has seen analytic philosophy gain traction among Japanese philosophers. This paper, which examines the status quo of analytic philosophy in Japan since 2000, consists of two parts. The first part deals primarily with organizations—specifically, relevant associations, journals, conferences, universities, and publishers are illustrated. The second part explores key works in each area—namely, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, philosophy of logic and mathematics, philosophy of mind, and metaphysics. Key works in other areas are also briefly addressed.