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Morale and the evolution of norms

Journal of Socio-Economics Volume 36 Issue 1 Page 48-57
published_at 2007-02
Title
Morale and the evolution of norms
Creators Teraji Shinji
Source Identifiers [PISSN] 1053-5357 [NCID] AA10867870
Creator Keywords
Morale Norm Socialization
This paper provides theoretical insights into the diversity of economic performances within organizations. Diverse morale and the evolution of norms interact in nontrivial ways. Individuals can acquire and internalize their norms through socialization. The process by which norms evolve exhibits generalized increasing returns. There are two steady states with different effort levels. If the norm, which is enforced by altruism, persists in the limit, everyone chooses the high effort level and high morale is sustainable. On the other hand, if the norm, which is enforced by envy, is persistent, everyone chooses the low effort level and the performance decays in the long run.
Languages eng
Resource Type journal article
Publishers Elsevier
Date Issued 2007-02
File Version Not Applicable (or Unknown)
Access Rights metadata only access
Relations
[isVersionOf] https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2005.11.029
[isPartOf] [URI]http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/10535357
Schools 経済学部