Herd behavior and the quality of opinions
Journal of Socio-Economics Volume 32 Issue 6
Page 661-673
published_at 2003-12
Title
Herd behavior and the quality of opinions
Creator Keywords
Herd behavior
Social learning
Opinions
Equilibrium selection
This paper analyzes a decentralized decision model by adding some inertia in the social leaning process. Before making a decision, an agent can observe the group opinion in a society. Social learning can result in a variety of equilibrium behavioral patterns. For insufficient ranges of quality (precision) of opinions, the chosen stationary state is unique and globally accessible, in which all agents adopt the superior action. Sufficient quality of opinions gives rise to multiple stationary states. One of them will be characterized by inefficient herding. The confidence in the majority opinion then has serious welfare consequences.
Languages
eng
Resource Type
journal article
Publishers
Elsevier
Date Issued
2003-12
File Version
Not Applicable (or Unknown)
Access Rights
metadata only access
Relations
[ISSN]1053-5357
[NCID]AA10867870
[isVersionOf]
[URI]http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/journal/10535357
Schools
経済学部