

sommaire

L'Exégèse biblique de Spinoza
— Théologie et philosophie,
leur séparation et leur coïncidence

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Paradoxalement, le *Traité théologico-politique* de Spinoza s'est attiré le blâme le plus furieux des cartésiens hollandais de son temps qui soutenaient, de même que Spinoza, tant la liberté de philosopher contre l'intolérance théologique que la séparation entre la théologie et la philosophie. Ce paradoxe s'explique par l'étrangeté frappante de l'exégèse biblique ou de la "théologie" redéfinie de Spinoza qui propose de ne pas présupposer dans le *verbum Dei* aucune "vérité des choses." Cette proposition, bien que faite sincèrement pour libérer ces intellectuels de la tâche désespérément conflictuelle de réconcilier la raison avec la foi au niveau de la vérité, ne fit que soupçonner l'artifice d'un athée pour ruiner l'autorité biblique. Spinoza en est pourtant sérieux: il atteste et accepte l'autorité par le fait que l'Écriture, en ce qui concerne de l'enseignement moral, et qui d'ailleurs coïncide avec la raison dans la pratique, s'est perpétuellement gardée contre toute falsification, et cela, en réalité, grâce à la *puissance de la multitude* (termes à apparaître dans le dernier *Traité politique*) qui ne sauraient rien de la vérité des choses. La notion de la fonction propice de la non-vérité dans l'histoire est donc ce qui lui permet de concevoir l'entre-deux qui est le dehors aussi bien de la théologie que de la philosophie, dehors où s'exerce pleinement la puissance de la Nature-Dieu.

Spinoza's Biblical Interpretation

— Theology and Philosophy,
Their Separation and Their Coincidence

Osamu UENO

The Question

It may seem odd that Spinoza, a decided rationalist philosopher who identifies Nature and God, spends a great deal of his *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (*TTP*), published anonymously in 1670, on biblical exegesis. The notorious scandal and the condemnation in mind, one may be misled to believe that, because of its radical demand for rationalist interpretation of the Holy Scripture, it caused the indignation on the part of conservative theologians. However, this is not the case.

As shown in recent historical studies, the attack and the blame of atheism came not so vehemently from those oppressive Gormarist theologians opposing, in favor of a strong monarchism, the tolerant policy of the then leading liberal Republicans as from more or less rationalist Cartesian theologians and philosophers who were proponents of "freedom of philosophizing," which, surprisingly, was also the advocacy of Spinoza's Treatise. The Treatise antagonized precisely those liberal intellectuals who sided with reason against the abuse of superstitious interpretation in theology.⁽¹⁾

The question is then: what was it in Spinoza's Biblical interpretation that alienated, perhaps against the author's will, those Dutch Cartesian rationalists despite the seeming likeness in theologico-political advocacies?

That the *TTP* is a trailblazer of modern historical exegesis is almost a common place. But this favorable assessment is not sufficient for answering the question we pose. Spinoza was not merely a forerunner of modernity; he emerged in the modern European world as a "*bloc*

inquiétant” as Paul Vernière once put it, and still remains so. The present paper will discuss the impelling uneasiness and the resistance which Spinoza’s exegesis stirred up on the part of Cartesian rationalism, in order to uncover the former’s unique – and somewhat disquieting – stance toward the Holy Scripture.

The Unrest of the Cartesian

It is not pertinent to overvalue the novelty of the principle that “knowledge of Scripture must be sought only from Scripture”, proposed in the *TTP* (*TTP* VII, p.106). It was already common among the Protestant theologians in their struggle against the Papal authority, and made them feel its burden. The absence of supervisory authority in biblical interpretation gave chance to all sorts of passionate disputes and turmoil. “No heretic without a text,” as Spinoza quotes a Dutch proverb. The Dutch Republic, though famed for its tolerance, was not exempt of sectarian clashes which gave a constant threat to the society. It is no wonder that decent theologians and philosophers came to make much of the role of reason in theological matter. In fact, many of the disciples of J. Cocceius, a leading figure among such liberal theologians, came to embrace Cartesian rationalistic attitude.

This forced the Dutch Cartesians to face the old nasty question their master Descartes himself had deliberately avoided. That is, to what extent reason is safe in biblical interpretation from harming piety.

For instance, Regnerus van Mansvelt, a Cartesian theologian who later blamed Spinoza for having erected an edifice of atheism, met the problem by separating theology from philosophy. Theological argument should not be confounded with philosophical one. And yet this should not mean that theological truth is in contradiction with philosophical truth, since truth cannot be in contradiction with itself.

His friend Christophorus Wittichius was in the same direction, giving caution against the confusion of theology and philosophy in the matter of physics which must be explicated independently of biblical descriptions.

Such idea of separation, which in appearance coincides with what the *TTP* proposes later, represents the standard opinion among the Dutch Cartesians of the time. Besides, it was convenient to them, who sought to ensure their posts in Dutch universities by differentiating themselves from the traditional upper faculties consisting of theology, medicine and jurisprudence.

But the idea of separation entangled them in an impasse. How and on what ground can we draw the separating border line when reading the Holy Scripture? If one admits that not all the miracles are sheer superstitious nonsense — resurrection and not transsubstantiation, for instance —, how can one tell which one to be genuine? If by natural reason, would not it mean to reduce mystery without which it would be no more than an ordinary natural event accountable by physics? If, on the contrary, by supernatural light, then why the others be played down which are equally unaccountable by reason? If one further maintains that both reason and supernatural light are telling one and the same truth only in different manners, then which of the two is in the competence to justify that sameness, and in what manner?

From these hopeless difficulties arose all sorts of Cartesian “deviation.” Lodewijk Meyer for instance. His book *Philosophia S. Scripturae Interpres* (1666) dared to bring the unsettled situations to an end by designating philosophy to be the last interpreter of Scripture. That is a logical consequence, once admitted that Scripture is the Word of God which tells truth, and that reason alone can discern which truth resides therein. The book shocked so much the moderate Cartesians. In fact, if Meyer was right, the Holy Scripture would be nothing more than a pedagogical means to betray philosophical truth in somewhat vague metaphor, and this would lead to say the Bible is redundant for philosophers. Threatened by this possible serious consequence, they urged promptly the civil authority of a ban.

But as long as the Cartesians insisted on the role of reason, they had no means of preventing such dangerous deviations. Later, *De Betoverde Weereld* (1691), written by another Cartesian Balthasar

Bekker, reproduced the scandal by its extremely rationalist interpretation of Scripture. All they could do was to appeal to a good sense any Christian was supposed to have, which, of course, was far from a solution.

Descartes deliberately kept Scripture away from his rationalist method. But he did not tell the reason why it should be kept away. It was the Dutch Cartesians that had to suffer the debt. They were in constant unrest – inner and outer, fearing extremist deviations which would not fail to give antagonistic theologians a pretext for persecution.

The Separation of Theology from Philosophy

All this leads us to presume that it was above all those restless Cartesians that Spinoza had in mind in addressing in the *TTP* as “philosophical readers.” He discloses in a letter that one of the motives for writing the Treatise is the “prejudices of theologians.” It is to be noted that he means to remove the prejudices not from the mind of those theologians but of “those who are more prudent.” Everything seems to fit, if we presume them to be the Cartesians at impasse, and the “prejudices” to be the conviction that Scripture tells truth no less than philosophy – a conviction which was pressing upon them endless difficulties and scruples.

Spinoza’s diagnosis shows how this fundamental prejudice produces “insanity” in exegesis. Paradoxically, Spinoza points out, it is the unverified presumption that “Scriptures is sincere and divine in every part” that spoils and makes the entire exegesis blind to its divinity (*TTP Praef. p.9*). For, once admitted the presumption, there follows almost automatically an alternative which is in reality impossible to decide which one to be chosen. I quote:

“Those who do not understand the distinction between philosophy and theology argue as to whether Scripture should be ancillary to reason, or reason to scripture; that is, whether the meaning of Scripture should be

made to conform with reason, or reason with Scripture. The latter view is upheld by the skeptics who deny the certainty of reason, the former by the dogmatists. But it is clear from our earlier findings that both parties are utterly mistaken, for whichever view we embrace we are forced to do violence either to reason or to Scripture. We have demonstrated that Scripture teaches only piety, not philosophy, and that all its contents were adapted to the understanding and preconceived beliefs of the common people. Therefore he who seeks to make Scripture conform with philosophy is sure to ascribe to the prophets many ideas which they never dreamed of, and will quite distort their meaning. On the other hand, he who makes reason and philosophy ancillary to theology has to accept as divinely inspired utterances the prejudices of a common people of long ago, which will gain a hold on his understanding and darken it. Thus they will both go mad (*insanire*), the one without reason, the other with reason." (TTP XV, p.180)

This quotation points out precisely the fundamental structure of the sterile disputes in theology, and in particular, the structure of the Cartesian unrest. The more the Cartesians make much of the role of reason in exegesis, the more, like the "dogmatist," they "go mad by reason." Once admitted that Scripture tells truth in every part, there will be no reason to restrict metaphorical interpretations. Any passage can be taken for a metaphor of some philosophical truth; the prophets are to be taken for philosophers. This will open the door to a disastrous license of reason and lead, against one's will, to reduce the divinity of the Bible (TTP II, pp.36-37). In fact, that was the extremity for which radical Cartesians like Meyer were destined.

Yet, on the contrary, if one tries, as the moderate Cartesians did, to reserve beyond rationality a sanctuary of the "supernatural," one accepts something as truth which is rationally incomprehensible (TTP II, p.35). This will make the claims indiscernible with superstitions and lead to another extremity, i.e. the "skeptics" who "go mad without reason."

Spinoza even suspects that the alternative is in fact a false one.

Those who insist on supernatural light use nevertheless rational reasoning in their arguments (TTP VII, p.112), while those who insist on reason need to mention some kind of supernatural light to decide which truth resides behind such and such enigmatic metaphor (TTP VII, p.114). In reality, the alternative positions shift into each other, so that it is hardly possible to maintain one position nor a neutral in-between. They are like doubles of each other, born from the same prejudice. From there arise endless vacillations where sane reason is constantly threatened by a fear that its freedom might turn into license and ruin religious piety.

As Spinoza diagnoses, those restless Cartesian intellectuals do not know how to separate theology and philosophy. Because of this fundamental shortcoming, their prudence for piety paradoxically puts them in constant danger of harming the divinity they want to preserve in the Scriptures.

The objective of Spinoza's argument on exegesis is now clear against this context. It was to relieve both the "philosophical readers" and the "divinity of Scripture" from the restless calamity, by proposing a final and genuine separation of theology and philosophy. The rules of Spinoza's exegesis are clear and simple. Stop interpreting the Holy Scripture in terms of "truth of reality." Resist the temptation of giving a rational account to speculative matters they seem to talk about.

"[I]n seeking the meaning of Scripture we should take every precaution against the undue influence, not only of our own prejudices, but of our faculty of reason in so far as that is based on the principles of natural cognition. In order to avoid confusion between true meaning (*verus sensus*) and truth of reality (*rerum veritas*), the former must be sought simply from linguistic usage, or from a process of reasoning that looks to no other basis than Scripture." (TTP VII, p.100)

So, when we find a mysterious utterance of Moses, we should not hasten to take it for a metaphorical allusion of some true idea of God. It is the study of the usage of ancient Hebrew and the statistical regularities

sorted out from the Mosaic texts that detect its true meaning. On the contrary, if we find whatsoever rational statement Moses makes, we should abstain from understanding it philosophically. It is the context — however strange it may be — given by the whole Mosaic texts that permits us to infer the true meaning (TTP VII, pp.100-101).

It is not enough to stress the modernity of Spinoza's exegesis by mentioning his historical method of restoring the compilation process and identifying prophetic styles, reference to the usage and the orthography of ancient Hebrew, etc.: Important is to seize what the *TTP* is doing with all those equipments. It is scanning, as one might say, the Holy Scripture as a surface. A surface without hidden secret, completely dissociated from the depth of arcana, patched with fragments along the time, each of which containing lapses and corruptions, sometimes written in forgotten orthographies — that is why the corpus produces hieroglyphic effects. Spinoza warns us to abstain from seeking therein allusions to speculative truth, for, since the prophets are seldom in agreement in those matters, that will only produce a corruption anew. If there is a divinity of Scripture at all, it must be sought not in hidden arcana but in some constant which gives positive consistency to the patched surface throughout the transmission (TTP IX, p.135).

What is that constant to prove the divinity? Spinoza's answer seems to be disappointing at first glance. It is the most banal moral teaching, easy to be comprehended by the common people, i.e. "to obey God with all one's heart by practicing justice and charity." Everyone knows it, no one can fail to recognize it. As we will see, it is because of this extreme banality that Spinoza ascribes to it the token of divinity (TTP VII, p.111).

In any case, theology is now separated definitely from philosophy. Since all the delusions and conflicts originate from the presumption that they both tell truth which cannot contradict itself, the only solution is to isolate theology and designate it as a study which has nothing to do with "truth." "The aim of philosophy is, quite simply, truth, while the aim of faith, as we have abundantly shown, is nothing other than

obedience and piety." Between them there is "no relation and no affinity," and this non-relation will assure their autonomy and co-existence (TTP XIV, p.179). Faith and reason, or theology and philosophy, have nothing to meddle in each other any longer. "[W]e should not be deterred if, after thus discovering the true meaning of Scripture, we find that it is at some points opposed to reason," because "whatever instances of this kind are to be found in the Bible, or whatever things men may fail to understand without detriment to their love of their fellow-men, we can be sure that these have no bearing on theology or the Word of God" (TTP XV, pp.184-185).

If theology has nothing to deal with truth, then what is its affair? The *TTP* shows it in practice. Theology is to determine dogmas on Deity which meet the logical requirements that they are "that which the obedience to God demands absolutely and without which the obedience is absolutely impossible" (TTP XIV, p.177). Those "dogmas of the universal faith" which anyone pious is supposed to embrace will put end to the restless doctrinal disputes (TTP XIV, pp.174-175).

As I argued elsewhere,⁽²⁾ that the divinity stated in those "dogmas" looks very much anthropomorphic provides no hindrance to Spinoza. That is nothing to be wondered at. The dogmas are not necessarily to be true; they only formulate the grammatical conditions of the ongoing human game of piety.

The Shocking Strangeness of Spinoza's Exegesis

As easily imagined, there were hardly anyone who understood Spinoza's radical proposal that the divinity of the Holy Scripture could be preserved only when relieved from "truth." How could his contemporaries, accustomed to identify the Word of God with truth, take it seriously? The Treatise was generally taken for a disguised plot of atheism which secretly intended to subvert the divine authority by confusing readers. Most of the Cartesians who accused the *TTP* were of this opinion. The reaction of Lambertus van Velthuysen, one of the most sincere and liberal Cartesian theologians of the time, will be

illustrative.

Van Velthuysen seems to be completely puzzled by the anonymous Treatise. He had to admit the similarity between the author and himself as to the demand for the freedom of philosophizing, call for a halt to the ongoing fierce controversies in theologico-political matters, etc. But the exegesis on which they were founded seemed to him a sheer nonsense. He writes to Jacob Ostens:

“[The author] does not think it of any importance even if it correctly follows from this axiom of his that the prophets and the holy teachers—and so God himself, who spoke to men through their mouths—employed arguments which, if their nature be considered, are in themselves false. For quite openly and in many places, when occasion offers, he proclaims and emphasizes that Holy Scripture is not intended to teach truth and the natures of things which are mentioned therein, and which it uses for its own purpose to train men to virtue.”

“So the author furthermore tells us that even when the prophets were admonishing of their duty those to whom they were sent, they were not free from mistakes of judgment. Yet this did not detract from their holiness and credibility, although they employed speech and arguments that were not true, but were adapted to the preconceived beliefs of those whom they were addressing, thereby urging men to those virtues which no one ever doubts and are not the subject of any controversy among mankind. For the purpose of the prophet's mission was to promote the cultivation of virtue among men, and not to teach any truth. [...] For he thinks that the grasping of truth in regard to other matters makes no contribution to piety, since moral holiness is not in fact to be found in such truth, and he holds that knowledge of truth, and also of mysteries, is necessary only to the extent that it promotes piety.” (Ep 42)

Van Velthuysen is not inaccurate in paraphrasing the points. He perceives correctly that the Treatise intends to dissociate the Bible from truth, and that is the scandal. Indeed, if it were right that the prophets

advanced arguments “which are not in themselves true, but were considered to be so by those they were addressing,” how could one avoid the implication that they, and consequently the Bible itself, worked a fraud? “This, at the very least, is evident from the author’s writing,” says Van Velthuysen, “that by his reasoning and arguments the authority of all Holy Scripture is impaired, and is mentioned by the author only for form’s sake.” Thus he concludes:

“So I think I have not strayed far from the truth, nor am I unfair to the author, if I denounce him as teaching sheer atheism with furtive and disguised arguments.”

His bewilderment is evident. Such an exegesis or a theology dissociated from “truth” is completely beyond his comprehension. He is not the only one who fail to take seriously the author’s claim that his intention was to defend Biblical authority. Not a small number of modern scholars, such as Leo Strauss, also take the Treatise for disguised arguments to insinuate atheism. If Spinoza is sincere in that claim,⁽³⁾ we should say that the Spinoza’s exegesis still remains as a “bloc inquiétant,” an incomprehensive block in our time.

Spinoza was quite serious in proposing such a “theology.” He concludes that we should accept Scripture’s authority without our judgment being called into question, even if it cannot be proved with mathematical certainty(TTP XV, p.187). He must have a sincere confidence in Biblical authority – only, for the reason other than what it says itself to be the reason.

The Coincidence of Theology with Philosophy

To get insight into Spinoza’s confidence, it must be noted that he claims not only separation, but also agreement of theology and philosophy. Beside philosophy, Spinoza coins theology anew:

“By theology I here mean, in precise terms, revelation in so far as it

manifests Scripture's objective as we have stated it, that is, the way of achieving obedience, or the dogmas of true piety and faith. In other words, by theology I mean the Word of God properly so called, which does not consist in a set number of books (see chapter 12). Theology thus understood, if you consider its precepts and moral teaching, will be found to agree with reason; and if you look to its purpose and end, it will be found to be in no respect opposed to reason, and is therefore valid for all men." (TTP XV, pp.184-185)

Agreement, certainly not on the ground of expressed truth, but of practical moral precepts. It is not difficult to confirm the factual coincidence of the practical precepts of the *Ethica* deduced by reason and the biblical teaching of "justice and charity." That is also why Spinoza recommends the redefined theology as "valid for all men." But if one sees therein only a modern attempt of rational religion, the point will be missed. The problem is elsewhere.

Spinoza is very much concerned with the paradoxical fact that the Scriptures preserve the moral precepts in spite of, or rather because of, their misconception of "truth of reality." In other words, the function of falsehood to produce rational effect as if it were truth. The divinity of Scripture, in Spinoza's view, is to be recognized therein. Scripture has been teaching the precepts without knowing their accord with natural reason.

We can notice this concern in the constant reference Spinoza makes to the marvelous fact that the kernel of moral teachings never suffered alteration nor corruption in its content throughout such a long term of transmission. The Bible is not like an ordinary text; it resists, at least as to the kernel, against falsification.

"Such alterations, as we have seen, take nothing away from the divinity of Scripture; for Scripture would be just as divine even if it had been written in different words or in a different language. Therefore there can be no doubt that the Divine Law has come down to us in this respect

uncorrupted. For from Scripture itself we learn that its message, unclouded by any doubt or any ambiguity, is in essence this, to love God above all, and one's neighbor as oneself. There can be no adulteration here, nor can it have been written by a hasty and errant pen; for if doctrine differing from this is to be found anywhere in scripture, all the rest of its teaching must also have been different. For this is the basis of the whole structure of religion; if it is removed, the entire fabric crashes to the ground, and then such a Scripture would not be the sort of thing we are now discussing, but a quite different book." (TTP XII, p.165)

Where does this incorruptibility come from? Needless to say, not that "some singular act of providence has preserved all the Sacred Books." On the contrary, what is at stake is the persistence of the moral kernel notwithstanding probable textual alterations(TTP IX, p.135). Nor that popular devoutness has preserved it, for "people in general seem to make no attempt whatsoever to live according to the Bible's teachings"(TTP VII, p.97). The reason Spinoza goes on to state is quite unusual:

"It is, then, incontestable that this has always been the teaching of Scripture, and therefore no error capable of corrupting this meaning can have entered without its being immediately observed by all, nor could anyone have deliberately corrupted it without his evil intent being at once detected."(TTP XII, p.165)

Corruption of the teaching has been impossible, not because the latter is demonstrable truth, but because it is so manifest to all that no one can be left unnoticed by others in falsifying it. In fact,

"[A]lthough there is no crime so abominable as not to have been committed by someone, there is no one who, to excuse his crimes, would attempt to destroy the law or to introduce some impiety as eternal doctrine and the road to salvation. For we see that human nature is so

constituted that any man (be he king or subject) who has committed a base action seeks to cloak his deed with such outward show as to give the impression of having done nothing contrary to justice and decency.” (TTP XII, p.166)

“We may therefore,” concludes Spinoza, “accept without reservation that the universal Divine Law, as taught by Scripture, has reached us uncorrupted.” What accounts for the incorruptibility is no longer the verity of the teaching but the reciprocal credibility that everyone believes everyone to believe it, which subordinates everyone to the overwhelming potency of the others. This alludes to the self-reproducing process which later comes to be formulated in the definition of “multitude’s power” in the *Tractatus Politicus*.⁽⁴⁾ Although the *TTP* reserves politics qua theory, is it not already obvious that it is this anonymous multitude’s power that gives consistency to the surface of Scripture? Is it not the ground for his proposal to accept the fundamental teaching of Scripture with “moral certainty”(TTP XV, p.185)?

Thus, we come to understand the agreement, or rather coincidence, of theology and philosophy which Spinoza perceives at the in-between of the “universal faith” which teaches obedience and the “universal ethics” deduced from natural reason alone. Spinoza perceives here the in-between where the both coincide each other, at least as to practical precepts of piety, the most advantageous to the communal praxis. This in-between is irreducible, for neither theology nor philosophy alone can account for the coincidence. We would not be impertinent to call the coincidence “God’s external help” defined by Spinoza. For, according to Spinoza, whatever falls to man’s advantage from the power of external causes can rightly be called “God’s external help,” and when the causes are unforeseen, “fortune”(TTP III, p.46). Is this a sheer atheism or an entire confidence in Deity?

In any case, it is evident that Spinoza, from the outset, was foreign to the disquieting question of reason: i.e. to what extent philosophy be

warranted in the matter of piety. The question of piety and impiety, the central theme of the Treaties as I discussed elsewhere, is now removed from both theology and philosophy, to the in-between where only the external acts are to be counted pious or impious. “[W]e cannot know anyone except by his works. He who abounds in these fruits - charity, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, gentleness and self-control, against which [...] the law is not laid down, he, whether he be taught by reason alone or by Scripture alone, is in fact taught by God, and is altogether blessed”(TTP V, p.80).

But how could his contemporaries follow that far? Spinoza’s Biblical criticism which aimed at preserving the divinity of Scripture by means of dissociating it from truth only ended up in a scandal, leaving those liberal rationalists in perplexity. According to a historian, the solution given by the *TTP* to the relation of faith and reason was accepted by few, and there was no one in the seventeenth century who dared to call themselves Spinozist.⁽⁵⁾

notes

First published in Japanese: “Spinoza no seisho-kaishaku – shingaku to tetsugaku no bunri to ittchi”, *Gendai-shiso*, vol.24-14, 1996.11.15, pp.122-131

Abbreviation

TTP *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (*Spinoza Opera*, III, C. Gebhardt (ed.), Heidelberg, 1925)

Ep *Epistolae* (*op. cit.* IV)

(1) As to the scandal and the Dutch Cartesians, I referred to the following studies:

J. Lagrée/P.-F. Moreau, Introduction, “Louis Meyer et Spinoza,” *Louis Meyer - La philosophie interprète de l’Écriture sainte*, Traduction du Latin, notes et présentation par Jacqueline Lagrée et Pierre-François Moreau (Intertextes Editeur, 1988); Paolo Cristofolini, “Quelques remarques sur Spinoza et les théologiens, à titre d’introduction,” Paolo Cristofolini (ed.), *L’hérésie spinoziste. la discussion sur le Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*,

1670-1677, et la réception immédiate du spinozisme (Amsterdam-Maarssen, 1995); Luisa Simonutti, "Premières réactions anglaises au *Traité théologico-politique*," Paolo Cristofolini (ed.), *op. cit.*; Wiep van Bunge, "Van Velthuysen, Batelier and Bredenburg on Spinoza's interpretation of the Scriptures," Paolo Cristofolini (ed.), *op. cit.*; Wiep van Bunge, "L'Athéisme de Spinoza," *Bulletin de l'Association des Amis de Spinoza*, No.29,1993; Wiep van Bunge, "The Early Dutch Reception of the *TTP*," *Studia Spinozana* 5, 1980; Wiep van Bunge, "Balthasar Bekker's Cartesian Hermeneutics and the Challenge of Spinozism," *The British Journal for the History of Philosophy* vol.1, no.1, Spring 1993, 55-79; Wim Klever, *Verba et Sententiae Spinozae or Lambertus van Velthuysen (1622-1685) on Benedictus de Spinoza* (Amsterdam, 1991); Richard H. Popkin, "Spinoza and Bible Scholarship," *The Books of Nature and Scripture : Recent Essays on Natural Philosophy, Theology, and Biblical Criticism in the Netherlands of Spinoza's Time and the British Isles of Newton's Time*, ed. by James E. Force and Richard H. Popkin (Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994); Chr. Hubert, *Les premières réfutations de Spinoza* (Presse de l'Univ. de Paris-Sorbonne, 1995); C.L.Thijssen-Schoute, *Nederlands Cartesianisme* (Utrecht: HES, 1989); C.L.Thijssen-Schoute, "Le cartésianisme aux Pays-Bas: ses caractères... ses principaux représentants," *Descartes et le cartésianisme hollandais: études et documents* (PUF, 1950); Theo Verbeek, "Les Cartésiens face à Spinoza: l'exemple de Johannes de Raey," Paolo Cristofolini (ed.), *op. cit.*; Theo Verbeek, "Tradition and Novelty: Descartes and Some Cartesians," Tom Sorell (ed.), *The Rise of Modern Philosophy* (Clarendon Press, 1993, 167-196).

(2) Cf. Osamu UENO, "Spinoza to keiken no bumpo – *Shingaku-Seijiron* no 'fuhenteki shinko no kyogi' wo megutte" ("Spinoza and the Grammar of Piety – the 'dogmas of the universal faith' in the *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus*"), *Philosophical Studies of Ymaguchi University*, No.4, 1995, pp.45-64.

(3) Cf. Leo Strauss, *What is Political Philosophy?* (New York: Free Press, 1959); Franis Kaplan, "Le salut par l'obéissance et la nécessité de la révélation chez Spinoza," *Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale*, 78, 1973,

pp.1-17; Jan den Tex, "Spinoza over de Tolerantie," *Mededelingen vanwege het Spinozahuis* 23, 1967, p.11; Madeleine Françès, "Notice aux Autorités Théologique et politique, Spinoza," *Spinoza: Oeuvres Complètes* (Bibliothèque de la Pléiade, Gallimard, 1954), pp.1456-1458; André Tosel, *Spinoza ou le crépuscule de la servitude: Essais sur le Traité Théologico-Politique* (Aubier, 1984), pp.50-69, pp.106-118.

(4) Cf. Osamu UENO, "Spinoza et le paradoxe du contrat social de Hobbes: <le reste>" 1991 *Cahiers Spinoza*, no.6, 1991, pp.269-296.

(5) C.L.Thijssen-Schoute, *op. cit.*,1950, p.257.

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