

# A Direction in Critical Development of Rawl's Theory

—Is Contractor an individual or a group member? —

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## Introduction

This paper is a part of my study to find out the main direction and concrete contents of the development of distribution and ownership of our age. Humans have taken much effort in finding the proper way of cooperation, that is the way of distribution and ownership. Any economic, social, political problem has always been able to be reduced to these questions, that are who gets what and why, and what ownership means in the field of distribution.

In modern age, after around 18th century, we've developed a new type of society, so-called civil one. This society is characterized to be the type which permits democracy to grow more than any preceding ones did. In its process of growth, democracy has given birth to two types of economic society, capitalist and socialist.

Socialist societies have much shorter history and are experiencing serious political and economic problems in 1980s and 90s. Capitalist societies also have come through many hardships, some of which are social instability caused by class conflict of 19th century, the 1929 crisis and the long stagnation of 30s, the big wars among capitalist countries in WWII, and the stagflation of the first half of 1980s. Both existing systems seem to have or at least have had until quite recently these serious defects.

Such negative side of our experiences have always posed the question of choice of economic systems but kept that unanswered. Although having experienced these serious economic problems, one more character of civil society which is that of growing democracy has never stopped proceeding. That means that people's wish to live through democratic relationship has never ceased to grow. [note1]

This growth of wish for democratic relationship cannot help influencing the economic problems above. When we come to the stage to try to adopt democratic principle to economic problems, the difficult question is what type of distribution system, and hence ownership system which affects it, would these people judge the best for themselves. To find out

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note 1 : It can best be exemplified in the recent disguised coup de'etat and its failure in the USSR in 1991. Here the citizens have shown much political movement in a short time, including even demonstrations before the tanks.

the direction of people's judgment, we must pay attention to the conditions people are put at. When the conditions for living differ, people under different conditions do choose different relationships. Here it becomes necessary to suppose different democratic patterns for distributive and ownership systems and probe the probability of each one.

Each pattern which we can think of is based on real people, different types of people, different in class, sex, age etc... And if there should be found out any tendency in the interaction among peoples, we may be able to foresee what type of distribution and ownership system would prevail in the future.

This type of question has been taken up seriously since 1950s by John Rawls and others for the first time after the social contract theorists like John Locke in the age of enlightenment. [note2] Rawls has tried to show what would be the basic economic rules in this type of highly developed economic societies. Although his theory contains some defects, his introduction of this question has shown before us an attractive field of economic and social study, especially on the question of economic systems. [note3]

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note 2 : John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, 1971, Harvard univ. press. John Locke, "Two Treatises of Government", Hafner Publishing Company, 1969.

note 3 : The Annual of Japan Economic Policy Association has taken up the question of Efficiency and Justice in Economic Policy in its 1979 meeting. In its forward, the program committee points at the recognition of the serious gap between growth and welfare among people and the difficulty of improving welfare through growth after the 1973 oil crisis as the additional reasons for the recent vivified discussion on this question. See p. 1.

In this paper, I aim to clarify a shortcoming of Rawls' theory of social contract, the wrong character of his contractor, and to provide a substitute a idea for it.

**1 Definition: Distribution and Ownership-Purpose and Means  
—Definition and Explanation of what is studied here—**

To explain in what sense the problem of character of contractor is argued here, it may be necessary first to comment on the question of distribution and ownership system. First to be explained is how distribution, ownership and changing character of contractor are related in this paper. Here, they are all dealt with as something meaningful in the context of human cooperation with each other. Every human, with little doubt, wishes to live longer and to breed as much. And for this purpose, they have found the measures, to cooperate.

To cooperate is working together and dividing the product among the participators. In cooperation, the final purpose for an individual is to get his own share. But the way of distribution of burden and product among them has changed from age to age. How has it changed, where is it headed for?

As for today, we are now at the end of twentieth century living in an age of working very closely-tied with each other, more than any preceding age, which literally means every one of us is working as a limb of a whole economic machine, nationwide or worldwide, consciously or unconsciously. This characteristic becomes a hint to the distribution system questioned above. This changing character of people from isolated to closely-tied must affect the people's behaviour of distribution, but how?

That is shown in the fact that, from today's point of view of closely

tied cooperation system, it does not seem so strange to talk about reforming the dividing system of products by the standard of "public" welfare, or "social" welfare, which are only meaningful when people do feel they are closely associated. When they are closely associated enough in working, they would probably feel they had better give up some of their power and give it to a public body if they can take in more goods than when he is only on his own.

This way of thinking, or to ask the way of distribution from the group point of view or the point of view of the changing character of individualistic nature of man leaves nothing unquestioned whatever ideas concerning "isolated" people. That would even include questioning the factor of ownership, which has been viewed sacred under the title of divine private property. [note4] Ownership, when it is viewed from the sacred nature of private ownership, is sometimes put outside of the seriously questioned problems. But today, as discussed in this paper, the proceeding of system reformation from distribution to ownership has come to be logically and realistically a very possible one.

Although we reason this way on one hand, we still seem to have some doubt on it on the other. This vague sense of uncertainty about our proceeding direction surely comes from the old, powerful idea of the "sanctity of private ownership", which is most clearly expressed by J. Locke. As there clearly is a contradiction between these two ideas, isolated people and private property and high division of labour, group-oriented people and questioning private property, we seem to have nothing but to choose either one.

The way to solve this problem is to separate purpose and means

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note 4 : see Locke.

clearly. As for the basic relationship between distribution and ownership, it cannot be denied that the former is always the purpose. Ownership can become a purpose against lower measure, but it is always ranked second to the final purpose, distribution. The main source of this seeming contradiction above is taking wrongly the means, ownership for the purpose. There surely have been some reasons seemingly persuasive enough for this wrong regarding. In Locke's age, when people are still working on their own, most of them were independent farmers, and working to live was working on his own and for himself and his families. In such an age, ownership of land meant almost the same thing as the whole distribution itself, getting one's own share.

And the age and the background situation have changed. Apart from whether we feel ourselves individualistic or group-oriented, people as a member of some group have already started to proceed to some kind of reformations of both systems. Distribution reformation is seen everywhere, as in income redistribution, and ownership reformation is on its way as expressed as "the restriction of private ownership from the point of view of public welfare."

Seen from such point of view, it can be said that we are at the crossed edge of two waves right now, and have to find out how much the new one is to advance, whether it is to overwhelm the old one or not.

Some factors we can observe today seem to show that it will. The factors are the followings [note5] :

① The contractors as group members become more closely tied with each other in production and that leads them to make the new-probably

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note 5 : see my paper 'Economic System and Distributive Rules: An Introduction', "Yamaguchi Journal of Economics, Business Administrations and Laws". (Yamaguchi Keizaigakuzasshi), Vol. 40-1·2, 1991".

more “economically democratic”- rule of cooperations by the following reasons ② to ④.

② Because of the more closely tied connections, the contractors' self-recognition changes toward enlarging oneself, that is coming to enlarging feelings for others. This causes strengthening “equal” feeling among the participants and then that strengthens the degree of equality in distribution. (Here, ‘equal’ means “proportionate equity”, as that of Archimedes, distributing according to each one's contribution, each one's work.)

This change of self-recognition is brought about by more contact with other people which is the result of the development of division of labour. Coming more in touch with others makes people feel each other more familiar most of the time.

In addition, development of division of labour means that job changing becomes more frequent. That means one or one's family members may engage in many kinds of jobs, which makes people think other people's post is not very far from him. This makes him think he had better pay attention to other people's job conditions more like his own, for it may become his, his family member's or his descendent's in the near future.

③ Through the long experience of growth of contact with each other in production, people have learned that humans are equal in power to live, against both nature and each other, they are not much different, not some people very much superior enough to others so they can keep their control over others for long. By the way, the sense of fairness is understood to be proportionate distribution mentioned above. And if the understanding of mutual similarity is brought into this field of proportionate distribution, one's sense of fair distribution comes to change

into distribution according to “pure” contribution. This rule becomes stronger, the more cooperation among people becomes inevitable, the more a complicated division of labour, a body of differently developed people becomes the first and most important factor for the strength of a society as a whole. [note6]

④ Under the development of division of labour, the speed of change, both in time and space, makes it more difficult for people to foresee the future of himself and his descendants. Here, change in time means the frequency of changing jobs, and change in space, the frequency of changing habitant places. The difficulty of foreseeing these factors decribed above makes people take the safety-first policy in the field of distribution, whose principle becomes the mutual insurance strategy. This type of new distribution system will be realized by any institution suited for it.

These would be the keys that will decide the future direction of distribution and ownership. What is studied here is focused upon the idea of “group” understanding of the character of contractor. That is to examine the significance of this idea by asking if that’s realistic and what help that idea can give in the understanding of modern and coming distribution systems. As is understood, Rawls’ theory starts from individuals (in democratic society) and these individuals are supposed to make certain kind of agreement upon the distribution systems. But this premise of individuals for principal factors seems to be unrealistic in the real world, both in the past and present. When this premise changes, that may affect his conclusion, the famous two principles.

In the following sections, I first discuss and criticize the understanding of Rawls’, the “individual” understanding of contractor in § 2, and

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note 6 : This I call “Hobbesian equality”.



then propose my substitute idea of “group” understanding in § 3.

## **2 Summary of Rawls' Theory: Especially on the Character of Contractor**

Rawls' theory aims at making a generalized form of social contract theory. The idea of social contract as a means of “constructing” society in general seems to be the only appropriate one in the age of civil society, whose distinctive character compared to precedent societies is its powerful pursuit for equitable right of everyone for deciding the type or the rules of society. And Rawls seems to be one of the most attractive social contract theorists in the latter half of the 20th century. As his main theme is, like his precedent social contract theorists, the “fair” or “just” distributive rules which is also the basic theme of this paper, to start from criticizing his theory will be one of the most fruitful ways for achieving the goal of finding the new direction of our distributive rules of today.

The old contract theory, the representative one of which is Locke's, presupposes a particular type of ownweship system, private property owning one. In this sense, this type of theory cannot be a general theory of social contract. Rawls tries to generalize this theory so that it can be one that deals with the basic structure of society which can be applied to any type of democratic societies. For this purpose, he sets premises of free, rational and equal individuals and adds to it “veil of ignorance” over them. And he supposes these individuals choose some kind of rules for the “basic structure of society”. This is called “the original agreement.” Here, it is supposed that this basic structure doesn't concern “particular society” or “particular form of government”. [note7] “The  

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note 7 : Rawls, op. cit., p. 11. Indicated as 'T. J.', p. 11 hereafter.

kinds of social cooperation that can be entered into and the forms of government that can be established” comes to question only after these basic agreement is reached. So it should be understood well that he doesn't talk about choosing any of real or theoretical concrete systems.

[T. J., pp. 273-4] “Which of these systems and the many intermediate forms most fully answers to the requirements of justice cannot...be determined in advance”. [T. J., p. 274]

According to the quoted remarks above, what he means by “basic structure” and what he aims at by his whole theory are very clear now, not concrete systems we like some type of capitalism or socialism but some kind of abstract agreement for any democratic society.

Next, we must proceed to main subject of this section, to probe the reality of his supposed premises, “free and equal” individuals and veil of ignorance. These two hypotheses play the basic roles in the structure of his whole theory.

The lines which most clearly expresses Rawls' individualistic character of his contractor is where the proposition of the original position and the veil of ignorance on which stands his famous principles are described. They are supposed to be as follows:

“In justice as fairness the original position of equality corresponds to the state of “nature” in the traditional theory of the social contract. This original position is not, of course, thought of as an actual historical state of affairs, much less as a primitive condition of culture. It is understood as a purely hypothetical situation characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice.”

“Among the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, not does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his

intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance."

"This ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of principles by the outcome of natural chance or the contingency of social circumstances. Since all are similarly situated and no one is able to design principles to favor his particular condition, the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain. For given the circumstances of the original position, the symmetry of everyone's relations to each other, this initial situation is fair between individuals as moral persons, that is, as rational beings with their own ends and capable, I shall assume, of a sense of justice. The original position is, one might say, the appropriate initial status quo, and thus the fundamental agreements reached in it are fair."

"This explains the propriety of the name "justice as fairness": it conveys the idea that the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair." [T. J., p. 12]

And the following part concerning what justice is should be quoted, too. "There is an identity of interests since social cooperation makes possible a better life for all than any would have if each were to live solely by his own efforts. There is a conflict of interests since persons are not indifferent as to how the greater benefits produced by their collaboration are distributed, for in order to pursue their ends they each prefer a larger to a lesser share. A set of principles is required for choosing among the various social arrangements which determine this division of advantages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper distributive shares. These principles are the principles of social justice:

they provide a way of assigning rights and duties in the basic institutions of society and they define the appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.“ [T. J., p. 4]

This final end of his theory, to reach an agreement on the proper distributive shares, and the “unanimity” condition quoted below, make Rawls adopt or make up the veil of ignorance hypothesis. “...if in choosing principles we required unanimity even when there is full information, only a few rather obvious cases could be decided. A conception of justice based on unanimity in these circumstances would indeed be weak and trivial.” [T. J., p. 141]

As is expressed above, his theory of justice is clearly based upon a hypothesis, that of veil of ignorance. But when a theory is concerned with real society, its usefulness is and must be measured by its applicability to the reality. In this sense, his theory cannot but be judged useless as far as that hypothesis, that hypothetical condition of human self-recognition is realistic.

Here we must probe the reality of this hypothesis. Actually it can be said that this hypothetical character of his theory is admitted by Rawls in the following sense. He says, “No society can, of course, be a scheme of cooperation which men enter voluntarily in a literal sense; each person finds himself placed at birth in some particular position in some particular society, and the nature of this position materially affects his life prospects. Yet a society satisfying the principles of justice as fairness comes as close as a society can to being a voluntary scheme, for it meets the principles which free and equal persons would assent to under circumstances that are fair.” [T. J., p. 13]

It is very clear here that although he knows that in a real society people act outside a veil of ignorance, he suddenly changes his topic and

starts to talk in a hypothetical way when he refers to his theory. He talks of his principles, but they can become meaningful only "if" such people exist, "if" original position is meaningful. The value of his theory all depends upon the reality of this hypothesis, which he leaves untouched.

Although not useful without proving its reality, this theory still is attractive for its concluding suggestion of charming two principles. These principles are attractive because it seems people feel like agreeing to the proposed distributive direction, people who may want to step out from existing systems or rules in a way. But nevertheless, his hypothesis, the veil of ignorance, keeps back his conclusion to an unrealistic stage for its unrealistic nature.

Here, is it possible to find a way to get over this problem of misconnection that only shows a goal but never the route?

To vitalize his theory, what seems necessary is to remake his idea of veil of ignorance. What should be done first is to recognize its uselessness, uselessness at least for this stage of today, and not to fear to take up the real people without any veil as the proper content of contractors. Rawls fears this, because he thinks without veil of ignorance there would be no unanimity upon social justice, principles or rules of justice. He fears to lose unanimity, probably believing that such an unanimity is a "must" as the first step of social construction. He believes there must be unanimity for basic agreements needed for social justice. This idea of unanimity being necessary is the very reason which keeps him in "going round and round" in his theory. Why is this idea of unanimity so important? And is this unanimity really necessary?

As for necessity, even if we are looking for some principle which support the basic structure of a society, I would say it doesn't always

have to be decided in unanimity. And as Rawls talks of, when that society concerned is a democratic one, even the basic structure of justice or any other matter is and can be decided in majority rule. As for the kind of unanimity suggested by Rawls, there has never been such unanimity derived from veil of ignorance anywhere, any time, and there seems no such possibility in the near future, either. We do not need it, and it has never been. When we come to the stage of “Hobbesian equality”, what alternative left for us is nothing except for democratic majority rule.

Why then, does Rawls think such an unanimity is so important? He does not state the reason clearly. One general reason we can guess could be if there should exist a fair, stable society, the constituents must be understood to be standing for the basic rules needed to keep that society united, apparently or tacitly. What is and has been historically real most of the time is surely a tacit admittance of social rules, but it's a much weaker one than this kind of tacit understanding of unanimity supposed to be necessary by Rawls here.

When we discard the idea of unanimity as being something indispensable for a stable society, there exists before us conflicting character of real societies. In real societies, people conflict with each other and they do so more as a group member, usually a member of some interest group. As far as and because people really do have full information of themselves, to reach unanimity even upon “basic” rules among different interest groups is almost impossible. Any rule cannot be judged objectively as far as it has to do with each one's distributive shares and participators know of their characteristics. Under such conditions,

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note 7 : And of course there would be serious social instability when such democratic political rule is not secured.

minority groups have discontent but as far as there is always the possibility of changing the situation by the next vote, there dose not have to exist any fear of serious social unstability. [note 7] Rawls talks of his distributive principles as something that indispensibly need unanimous agreement, but really it is not necessary. What rule that really indispensibly needs unanimous assent is only the political decision rule, which seems to be now the democratic rule, that of majority rule. This is all that is necessary as unanimity is concerned. And this is the very achievement of long history of civil, democratic societies.

So, there is a misunderstanding of the necessity of unanimity. There are two levels of rules in civil society concering the distributive rules, but what needs unanimity is only the political level. This is where Rawls is mistaken. Through such an understanding of unanimity, we can then go on to ask the content of groups and conflicts caused among them. Under such conditions, unanimous distributive rules would not be available, but such lack of unanimity does not matter here. What matters here, what is worth being studied here will only be the changing direction of conflicts among groups which decide the content of distributive rules.

People have been acting not only as self-interseted and rational individuals, but also as members of interest-groups, and it has been the latter that have exercised more influence upon people's acts and their deciding the contents of social justice. We must start from this group-oriented character of contractor. At the very starting point, a social constituent is surely individual and self-interested, but that very fact dose not decide at once the content of distributive rules. Most of the time, one has tried to achieve his basic purpose of surviving by cooperating with others, but usually that means making various kinds of small

groups, not proceeding to make a country-like society at once. As long as there exists interest conflicts among groups, these groups find each other hostile, at least not much commutable, as have been most of its recorded history. But once they get the framework of civil society or democratic political rule, that brings us up to the stage where are not any serious social conflict, social instability any more.

How long this group-inclined character would last depends upon how the surviving conditions change. These conditions change according to the development of productive power. And it may well be possible that under some unique conditions, no more group dependency might be necessary, and people could be able to act more on purely individual character.

So, we must first understand what kind of group-orientation existing surviving conditions make people adopt. The kind of individualistic self-recognition that Rawls supposes under a veil of ignorance in the original position, cannot appear till people really get rid of his group-oriented character. And this disappearance of group-orientation will become possible only when he is born to be out of any necessity to depend upon any small groups. Under such conditions, people would agree to the principles of justice proposed by Rawls, because there would be no more advantage or disadvantage belonging to such small groups. In this sense, they would be in the equal position, and this time the equality is not hypothetical like Rawls' but realistic. So, what matters is rather the factors that work for the disappearance of group-orientation than introducing hypothetical veil of ignorance. But till that change really happens, people do live under recognized unequal conditions the substance of which is group-dependency, or group-orientation. Here they do not live not only as "self-interested but



morally equal, rational" individuals but as members of specified interest group, and it is the latter that decide the distributive rules, not unanimously but through majority rule among different interest groups. We must start from the reality, group conditions.

### **3 Critical Development of the Character of Rawls' Contractor —To Group—**

By examining the way to develop Rawls' theory, we have reached the conclusion that at this historic stage, we have to introduce group-inclination of human character into our premises for distributive justice. And by so doing, we'd rather be able to come up to the stage where we can use without any detention the notion of free and equal individuals proposed by Rawls. So then, next to be considered is the content of "group" character of humans of today. What are the groups we face at now, and what directions does today's interaction of groups point at as the main direction of our distributive justice?

Here, it would be useful to take up first the related idea of Milton Fisk on this matter. He is one of few to comment on this question of the character of contractor in Rawls theory.

He also looks at this question from "group" understanding. He accuses Rawls that "On Rawls' view that individual is isolated by nature, the principles of justice will be seen primarily as checking individual self-interest, not group tendencies. It is individual abuse of wealth and individual cheating, not the more or less coordinated efforts of group members to restrict liberties and maintain the maldistribution of income, that concern Rawls."

"... for the individual as a class member, there can be no agreement on principles of justice except as expedients to survive an historical

period during which the class could gather strength and prepare for the realization of its tendencies.” [note 8]

It should be noted here that Rawls also refers to the notion of class in his book. [T. J., p. 78]

“To illustrate the difference principle, consider the distribution of income among social classes. .. Now those starting out as members of the entrepreneurial class in property-owning democracy,.. have a better prospect than those who begin in the class of unskilled laborers. It seems likely that this will be true even when the social injustices which now exist are removed. What...can possibly justify this kind of initial inequality in life prospects? According to the difference principle, it is justifiable only if the difference in expectation is to the advantage of the representative man who is worse off, in this case the representative of unskilled worker.” “The point is that something of this kind must be argued if these inequalities are to satisfy by the difference principle.” (T. J., p. 78. The last underlined part is substitute for “be just”. It is corrected by the list of the author’s correction. See the last pages of Japanese translation, p. 480.)

Clearly he doesn’t exclude the possibility of changing class structure here, but he stoppes here and goes no further to probe the probability or necessity of such a change. He only proposes his difference principle which only talks of participators in general and general rules among them which cannot help becoming very abstract. It talks of difference principle which will be useful and suitable only for equal participators and if participators were equal, they would probably choose such

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note 8 : Fisk, ‘History and Reason in Rawls’ Moral Theory’, Norman Daniels ed., “Reading Rawls”, New York, 1974, pp. 72-3. Indicated as ‘Fisk. pp. 72-3’ hereafter.

principle as best. But the problem is if they are equal itself. Lacking this point of view, Rawls' theory cannot but be accused of being fanciful. So, the significance Rawls' class notion has is not the same as Fisk's. It is only referred to as one of the factors that affect people's life prospect and what matters here for Rawls is only that these factors do affect it. And in Rawls' theory, these factors lose their significance together by going behind the veil of ignorance. On the contrast, Fisk proposes his class notion as something that affects the concrete contents of existing distributive rules.

Appraising these two class notions this way, we can say Rawls's way of dealing with this notion is not quite directly helpful in solving our problem of finding the changing direction of our distributive system. Still today, it is the interaction of specific group conflicts among property owning and non-owning groups, sexual groups, geographical groups, racial groups, etc. that regulate people's judgement in choosing social or distributive principles. We must probe the character of this interaction among groups to find the coming direction of distributive rules.

Concerning the problem of interaction, one point at issue here suggested by Fisk would be the degree of necessity of substituting the idea of social (=individual) contract by that of "class contract". Fisk argues that "The idea that society is a collection of individuals" is wrong.

[Fisk, p. 69] "Instead of a social contract, why not a class contract?"

[Fisk, p. 78] This point of view is included in the view of 'group orientation' in this paper, and is worth being studied. And here it seems necessary to be understood that there is always left the possibility of majority people, probably workers class, choosing the capitalistic class society under no pressure from the capitalist class. This has not been

dealt with by the socialist thinkers, and this is only literally a pure possibility yet but still I think it is a point that deserves enough attention today.

The probability of such an admittance of capitalist ownership framework by the working class depends at least partly on the recognition of the possibility of people of lower class moving up to upper class. When the majority of people judge this movability very high, they may admit the class society and distributive rules based upon it. This all depends upon the realized concrete conditions of them in a specific society. We must therefore probe each society of these conditions and the degree of this recognition among constituents. [note10]

## Conclusion

In social cooperation, and especially in economic cooperation, distributive share for each participator is the final purpose and the type of ownership is a means for it. When the change of the type of cooperation changes the content of the interaction among various interest groups, the types of distribution and ownership must change, too.

The tendency of the change in cooperative structure seems to change

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note10 : One basic direction that seems to be suggested from the interaction of groups of today is the understanding of each other having more similar characteristics than ever and these similar characteristics would work toward making constituents feel more and more equal, which tendency would work for letting constituents choose more equal distributive rules than ever. (Mentioned in introduction, ①-④.) This would happen in any society which division of labour and productivity keep growing, whether there are conflicts among classes, sexual groups, etc. Elucidating the works of these factors, ①-④, and confirming their influences in the interactions of the groups will be the next step necessary for understanding the direction of coming social and distributive rules or justice.

the character of people more from individualistic to group-oriented, or from an isolated individual to a group member.

Rawls has made a great contribution in proposing an attractive field of modern type of social-contract theory. He advanced attractive principles of justice in distribution of burden and products, but it is based on an unrealistic assumption of isolated individuals, veil of ignorance and the confusion of necessary unanimity in political and economic fields.

To develop a more realistic theory, we have to substitute his assumption by group-oriented character of real people. This will provide a more realistic base for the pursuit of social and economic justice of today. To probe the interactions among the groups of today, and to find the new direction of distribution suggested there would be our next task.

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