Necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Zero-Determinant strategies in repeated games
Journal of the Physical Society of Japan Volume 91 Issue 8
Page 084801-
published_at 2022-07-11
Title
Necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of Zero-Determinant strategies in repeated games
Abstract
Zero-determinant strategies are a class of memory-one strategies in repeated games which unilaterally enforce linear relationships between payoffs. It has long been unclear for what stage games zero-determinant strategies exist. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of zero-determinant strategies. This condition can be interpreted as the existence of two different actions which unilaterally adjust the total value of a linear combination of payoffs. A relation between the class of stage games where zero-determinant strategies exist and other class of stage games is also provided.
Source Identifiers
[EISSN] 1347-4073
Languages
eng
Resource Type
journal article
Publishers
Physical Society of Japan
Date Issued
2022-07-11
Rights
©2022 The Physical Society of Japan()
File Version
Accepted Manuscript
Access Rights
embargoed access
Relations
[isVersionOf]
https://doi.org/10.7566/JPSJ.91.084801
Funding Refs
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science
Award
Economic theory of information markets based on information science
20K19884
Funding Refs
Inamori Foundation
Award
Mathematical structure of payoff control in repeated games